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Abstract—With the advent of various access technologies and 
increasing number of applications, a set of challenges concerning 
efficient delivery of ubiquitous services to heterogeneous users 
and devices have been posed. One of the important challenges is 
to integrate Quality of Service (QoS), security and mobility 
support in heterogeneous networks. To facilitate the 
interworking of these mechanisms we propose the concept of 
Enhanced Node (EN) in this paper. The EN is an intelligent entity 
with a network sub-layer, which integrates QoS, security and 
Mobility Management （MM）. ENs are located in the access 
network and they communicate with each other via signalling. In 
this paper, the functionalities of the ENs are described and the 
framework with ENs to integrate QoS, security and MM in IP-
based networks is presented. The mechanisms to provide the 
authenticated and authorized access control and to enhance the 
secured QoS combined fast handovers are also proposed.  
Keywords-QoS; Security; Mobility Management; Enhanced 
Node; AAA 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The paper is based on the Ubiquitous Services MVCE Core 
4 project, which is working towards accelerating the 
commercialisation of ubiquitous services by removing the 
barriers to deployment and adoption from the network 
perspective. The key barrier to accessing ubiquitous services 
arises from the need to manage delivery of multiple services 
within different Quality of Service (QoS) environments 
through multiple heterogeneous networks. This heterogeneity 
makes co-operation among them a complex issue. The 
solution proposed in this paper is to design a common network 
support sub-layer to integrate QoS, security and mobility 
functions efficiently. The sub-layer consists of elements of 
QoS, security and mobility with radio resource management 
(RRM) hooks. The nodes with the sub-layer support are 
referred to as ‘enhanced nodes’ (EN). Within such a 
framework, translation of QoS, security and mobility 
mechanisms is required; a common representation of such 
mechanisms will be used in signalling between ENs to support 
this (horizontal integration). The ENs, in turn, will operate 
within the constraints of their access networks, such as the 
ability to perform authentication and authorization with the 
help of AAA entities, to perform resource management, to 
control routing and traffic flow with the aim of meeting the 
desired end-to-end performance criteria (vertical integration). 
Such an approach potentially allows existing 
telecommunication networks to be enhanced without the 
additional delays associated with network standardisation 
through selective upgrades of a limited number of network 
nodes [1]. 
II. ARCHITECTURE FOR THE ENHANCED NODE 
In this section, the architecture and framework of the ENs 
describing the components of the framework and their 
functionalities are presented. The primary functionality of the 
EN is to gather QoS, security and mobility information from 
various parts of the access network and across heterogeneous 
networks and share this information when required by 
different entities. As a result ， this will enhance the 
performance of existing network mechanisms and assist the 
translation of mechanisms between heterogeneous networks. 
The EN is constituted of five major components namely: QoS, 
Security, Mobility Management (MM), RRM and Signalling 
as shown in Fig.1. These components interact with each other 
and consider the cross issues rather than operating 
individually. This is illustrated in the figure through the 
double headed arrows between the components [1]. 
A. Mobility Management 
The mobility component of the sub-layer provides the 
framework to manage the functions relating to MM within 
access network and across access networks. This entity can 
function as the Mobility Anchor Point (MAP) of Hierarchical 
Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) but can also enhance the existing MM 
mechanisms. It does this by providing them with additional 
information required to take optimal decisions regarding 
mobility within and more specifically across access networks 
[1]. The mobility entity will interact with other entities 
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involved in providing mobility to Mobile Nodes (MN) as 
shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 1.  The architecture of the enhanced node 
 
Figure 2.  Mobility entity interaction with other entities [1] 
 
Figure 3.  QoS entity interaction with other entities [1] 
 
Figure 4.  Security entity interaction with other entities 
B. Quality of Service Provisioning 
The QoS component of the EN plays a vital role in terms of 
providing QoS throughout the network and across 
heterogeneous networks. This entity provides a virtual link 
between access networks to share information regarding 
resources and other QoS parameters. Per-flow based QoS 
architecture like Intserv with resource reservations can benefit 
with the additional knowledge of the network in providing 
optimal resource reservations and minimizing blocking 
probability. Reestablishing traffic flows after handover can 
also be enhanced by this entity. With the greater overview 
knowledge of the network, traffic flows can be optimally 
redirected to the new destination minimizing delays. This 
entity will also work closely with routing in the network 
identifying the paths with the required QoS. Traffic flow and 
congestion management also come under this entity. Fig. 3 
shows some of the possible interactions between the QoS 
entity of the EN and the other entities of the network. The 
dotted lines designate non-physical entities such as traffic 
shaping, congestion control, traffic flow management，etc [1]. 
C. Security 
The security component of the sub-layer plays a crucial role 
in providing security services within one access network and 
across heterogeneous networks. Before a MN can enter an 
access network, it should be authenticated and authorized by 
certain access control scheme with the help of AAA entities. 
The EN acts as an AAA client, which is connected to both of 
the access routers (AR) and the AAA servers. Under this 
infrastructure, authentication can be performed together with 
MM signalling. Also, the MN is authenticated for the 
handover and the handover signalling between the EN and the 
MN can be secured by handover key. Therefore, the EN, 
which is also an AAA client, is in charge of the security 
services throughout the networks, in terms of controlling the 
authenticated access and the key generation.  Fig. 4 shows the 
interactions between the security entity of the EN and the 
other entities of the network. The dotted lines illustrate the 
security services provided by the EN, such as the secured 
handover and the authenticated access control. 
D. Radio Resource Management 
The RRM entity provides the framework for managing 
radio resources during handovers. A typical scenario is during 
the occurrence of a handover, in which the EN could help 
identify the access point (AP) with the necessary radio 
resources for the MN to connect. This would not be possible 
without having a higher level of intelligence within the 
network [1]. 
E. Signalling 
The signalling entity plays an important part. This entity 
enables the EN to gather information and share information 
through signalling other entities. Integration of QoS, security 
and MM within one network using a common signalling 
approach is necessary if efficient delivery of pervasive 
services is to become feasible for the network operator [1].  
III. THE BASELINE ARCHITECTURE 
The ENs interact with other like nodes present within the 
access network and across other access networks [2] as shown 
in the baseline architecture in Fig. 5.  In this figure more than 
one EN is located within each access network and these nodes 
communicate with each other via signalling. The architecture 
assumes a loose coupling between the networks involved 
where the access networks are connected through the core IP 
network and any interaction between the access networks has 
to go through the core IP network [1]. 
The aim of this IP network is to deploy QoS, security and 
MM mechanisms in order to provide enhanced services to 
users. However  these mechanisms have interactions with each  
 
Figure 5.  Baseline architecture for the enhanced node  
 
Figure 6.  QoS, security and mobility architecture framework 
other and the performance of one is affected by the working of 
the others. One of the major issues to be addressed is 
providing satisfactory QoS and security during handovers. 
Many mechanisms have been proposed to solve this issue and 
the EN can play a vital role in this scenario. Also, from 
security point of view, the EN assists in providing MN the 
authenticated and authorized access control with the help of 
AAA servers when the MN moves across access networks. 
Another major area is in routing and traffic flow within the 
access network. The traffic flow within an access network 
with HMIPv6 micro-mobility architecture would flow through 
MAPs in the network creating bottlenecks and high 
congestions. Hence regulating traffic flow and avoiding such 
bottlenecks are vital for efficient performance of the access 
network. The ENs can greatly improve the performance of 
existing mechanisms and provide solutions to many of the 
cross issues.  
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR THE COMBINED QOS, SECURITY AND 
MOBILITY MECHANISMS 
Much research has recently been undertaken in proposing 
and designing QoS, security and MM mechanisms based on 
the IP paradigm. In all of this work, different design 
approaches have been considered for each such mechanism in 
isolation, without considering their inherent interactions. 
When integrated into one network, they either do not work or, 
at least, do not work as well as expected. For example, within 
the IST BRAIN [3] and MIND [4] projects, such mechanisms 
were designed and optimized separately but once put together, 
the overall performance was not as expected. The lesson 
learned from such research was to design them using the same 
approach and simultaneously with a common signalling 
protocol. The negative cross issues between QoS and security 
need to be addressed in terms of minimizing the handover 
latency caused by security mechanisms and securing the QoS      
signalling if necessary. Although aimed at solving different 
aspects of network operations, both QoS routing and micro-
mobility protocols influence packet forwarding in scoped 
domains. Hence, applying different QoS routing schemes [5] 
inside mobile network domains calls for an investigation of 
the cross issues with micro-mobility protocols [6], [7] and [8]. 
In [9] it was shown that such cross issues can be so significant 
that routing decisions between the two mechanisms may 
contradict resulting in a sudden break of communication 
between the gateway of the scope domain and the mobile host.  
In this section, we define and discuss the framework for the 
combined QoS, security and mobility mechanisms. The   
signalling diagrams are used to illustrate the functionality of 
the ENs as well as emphasize the details of the combined 
mechanisms. This work considers an IP-based access network, 
assumes HMIPv6 as the default mobility agent protocol and 
supports a generic QoS framework able to support both Intserv 
and Diffserv architectures. The EN is given the role of MAP. 
The main elements of the architecture are shown in the 
signalling diagram Fig.6. The gateway is a special purpose 
router with interfaces between the access network and an 
external IP network. The ENs are essentially normal mobility 
agents enhanced by an innovative network support layer. The 
ENs are responsible for integrating QoS, security and mobility 
efficiently within the access network. The role of the EN is to 
minimize the delays involved in reestablishing the QoS after a 
handover and to help establish the handover keys to secure the 
handover process. In terms of security, the ENs, acting as the 
AAA clients which connect to the AAA servers in both of the 
foreign domain and the home domain, also play an essential 
role in authenticated access control. The ENs are also assigned 
the functionality of monitoring the resources used by the 
existing sessions. Since most of the sessions requiring high 
QoS and low latency flow through the EN, the EN will be able 
to perform call admission and also shape the traffic in the 
access network as well as regulate the QoS. The aim in terms 
of QoS and mobility is to keep any required signalling within 
the EN domain [10] and from security point of view to interact 
with the AAA servers to provide secured services. 
A. Authenticated Access Control 
Fig.7 shows the signalling involved when security and 
mobility signalling are coupled to each other. The 
authenticated and authorized access control needs to be 
executed before the network access is granted to the MN. The 
method to provide authenticated access for IPv6 supported 
mobility was proposed in [11]. Similar concept is applied in 
our framework. The authentication messages and registration 
signalling, including the Binding Updates (BU) and Binding 
Acknowledgements (BA), are combined. Therefore, 
authentication and registration are completed in one round-
trip-time (RTT). 
 
Figure 7.  Signalling for authenticated access control 
After AR issues a Router Advertisement (RA) message to 
MN, the MN sends the security combined BUs, which include 
the BUs to EN and Home Agent (HA) together with 
authentication request. Upon receiving the combined BUs, the 
EN, acting as an AAA client, initiates an AAA request and 
sends the request together with the BU (only the BU to HA) to 
AAA server in foreign domain, namely AAAF. The AAAF 
forwards the message to AAA server in home domain, namely 
AAAH. With the help of HA, the AAA request can be 
processed locally by AAAH, which initiates an AAA response 
message as the result. At the same time, the BU is sent to the 
HA by AAAH. Then, the AAAH forwards the security 
combined BA, which includes the AAA response and the BA 
from HA, to AAAF. Using the AAA response received from 
AAAF, the EN can decide whether the MN can be granted the 
network access. Then the EN sends the BAs, including the 
BAs from EN and HA, over to the MN. The EN plays a vital 
role in this procedure, in terms of controlling both of the 
registration signalling and the authenticated network access. 
B. Intra Domain Handover 
Fig. 8 shows the packet flow and the signalling involved 
when QoS and mobility signalling are coupled to each other. 
The concept of QoS conditionalised handovers was first 
introduced in [12]. The concept behind this is to use the same 
signalling for sending the BU and the QoS request instead of 
sending two different signalling messages. We use a similar 
concept. One signalling message to notify the ENs about the 
update in the location of the MN as well as setting up the new 
QoS path to the new destination. As the number of MNs 
increase so does the mobility rate. As a result of this increase, 
the signalling overhead will be very large. This proposed 
solution halves the signalling overhead and at the same time 
halves the QoS based handover time for the MN [10]. 
From security point of view, the secured handover scheme 
that generates the handover key (HK) to protect the handover 
process is clearly illustrated in Fig. 8 as well. It was proposed 
in [13] a key management method to secure the Fast 
Handovers for Mobile IPv6 (FMIPV6) signalling. With some 
modifications and extensions, the method can be applied here. 
The MN is authenticated for the handover. The key generation 
procedure takes place before the handover, therefore, the HK 
can be used to protect the handover signalling and the QoS 
signalling involved if it is necessary.  
 
Figure 8.  Signalling for intra domain handover 
A MN, upon attaching to an AR, sends a handover key 
request (HKReq.) message, which includes a set of keying 
materials, to the AR. The AR then forwards the request to EN. 
The EN, as an AAA client, then initiates an AAA request 
encapsulating the HKReq. information and sends it to 
handover key server (HKS), which is also the AAAF server. 
By validating the Message Authentication Code (MAC) in the 
HKReq. message, the HKS can authenticate the MN. Also, a 
unique and fresh session key can be derived using the keying 
materials at the same time. The HKS then returns an AAA 
response message to the EN. The keying materials and the HK 
are encapsulated in this AAA response message. Upon 
receiving the response from the HKS, the EN then decrypts 
the HK and sends a handover key response (HKResp.) 
message to the AR. The HKResp. message includes the HK 
and the keying information. After the AR receives the 
HKResp. message, it stores the HK and sends the response 
over to the MN, including the keying materials that the MN 
requires to generate the HK.  
The MN is authenticated before performing handover and 
requesting resource so that the adversary can not book out all 
the resources leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. 
After the HK is finally generated at the MN, it can be used to 
secure the signalling involved in the handover process 
afterwards, such as the BU or even the QoS combined BU.  
C. Inter Domains Handover 
One of the major areas where work still needs to be done is 
in the process of inter mobility agents handovers. During a 
handover between mobility agents, the location update needs 
to be sent to the correspondent node (CN) and the HA. During 
this, the regional care of address (RCoA) obtained from the 
mobility agent changes and the packets that the CN transmits 
to the MN need to be readdressed to the new RCoA of the new 
mobility agent. In the proposed architecture the handover will 
occur between ENs [10].  
Fig.9 shows the signalling for inter ENs handover scenario 
with combined QoS and mobility update. During the handover 
period the packets arriving at EN1 are stored and redirected to 
EN2 where the MN is currently connected [10]. This process 
is clearly illustrated in Fig. 10. The MN associates itself with a 
new EN and obtains a new RCoA. In turn the MN then 
performs a global location update to its CN which could result 
in large delays and packet loss. During this handover period 
packets generated by CN will still be arriving at the MN’s old 
location (EN1). To minimize the loss in packets, the EN1 
redirects the packets it receives from the CN to the new 
location of the MN (EN2). In turn EN2 tunnels these packets 
to the MN. To make this possible the address of EN2 needs to 
be temporarily registered with the EN1. Therefore the 
maximum delay experienced is the time it takes for the MN to 
receive a new IP address (from EN2) and notify EN1 about its 
new location. This delay can be minimized if the ENs have 
prior knowledge of the surrounding ENs as well as location 
information of the MN. For example, by using fast handovers 
 
Figure 9.  Signalling for inter-EN domains handover  
 
Figure 10.  Packet redirection during inter-EN domains handover [10] 
EN1 can be notified about the new location of the MN (EN2 
and local address) before the handover takes place [10]. 
Fig.9 also shows the signalling for handover key generation 
procedures. The process is similar as described in the Intra 
domain handover. The HK can be used to secure the signalling 
in the fast handovers, such as fast BU (FBU). MN first 
informs EN2 of the attachment and also confirms the use of 
new CoA. With HK generated, the MN then sends a FBU 
message with the HK over to EN2. The EN2 forwards the 
FBU with the HK to EN1. With the HK previously generated, 
EN1 can validate the FBU and authenticate the MN. Then, the 
EN1 can send a fast BA (FBA) to EN2 to finish the fast 
handover registration. The HK can also be used in a similar 
way to secure the QoS combined BU to make the QoS 
message resilient to DoS attack. And MN is authenticated 
before the QoS context transfer takes place. This ensures the 
QoS context is transferred to the EN2 as it claimed but not an 
adversary, which prevents the masquerading attack. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The proposed scheme with ENs can integrate QoS, security 
and MM rather than managing them independently in IP-based 
access networks in order to deliver ubiquitous services 
efficiently and securely. With the integration approach, the 
negative cross issues between QoS, security and MM can be 
minimized and the network performance can be enhanced in 
terms of reducing the handover latency, network congestion, 
load balancing and packet loss probability. Based on the 
baseline framework, the security mechanisms are presented to 
provide mobile user network access control, and also to 
enhance secured QoS combined fast handovers. The security 
framework can result in better resilience to security attacks, 
amongst other benefits. The quantitative benefits of the 
proposed framework are currently being modelled and 
quantified by the Performance Evaluation Process Algebra 
(PEPA) [14]. PEPA is a mathematical tool which models and 
reasons about the structure and behavior of systems. 
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